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Background: While multi-drug resistant organisms (MDRO) are a global phenomenon, there are significant regional
differences in terms of prevalence. Traveling to countries with a high MDRO prevalence increases the risk of
acquiring such an organism. In this study we determined risk factors for MDRO colonization among patients who
returned from a healthcare system in a high-prevalence area (so-called transfer patients). Factors predicting
colonization could serve as screening criteria to better target those at highest risk.
Methods: This screening study included adult patients who had been exposed to a healthcare system abroad or in
a high-prevalence region in Switzerland over the past six months and presented to our 950-bed tertiary care
hospital between January 1, 2012 and December 31, 2013, a 24-month period. Laboratory screening tests focused
on Gram-negative MDROs and methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA).
Results: A total of 235 transfer patients were screened and analyzed, of which 43 (18 %) were positive for an
MDRO. Most of them yielded Gram-negative bacteria (42; 98 %), with only a single screening revealing MRSA (2 %);
three screenings showed a combination of Gram-negative bacteria and MRSA. For the risk factor analysis we
focused on the 42 Gram-negative MDROs. Most of them were ESBL-producing Escherichia coli and Klebsiella
pneumoniae while only two were carbapenemase producers. In univariate analysis, factors associated with screening
positivity were hospitalization outside of Europe (p < 0.001), surgical procedure in a hospital abroad (p = 0.007),
and - on admission to our hospital - active infection (p = 0.002), antibiotic treatment (p = 0.014) and presence of skin
lesions (p = 0.001). Only hospitalization outside of Europe (Odds Ratio, OR 3.2 (95 % CI 1.5- 6.8)) and active infection on
admission (OR 2.7 (95 % CI 1.07- 6.6)) remained as independent predictors of Gram-negative MDRO colonization.
Conclusion: Our data suggest that a large proportion of patients (i.e., 82 %) transferred to Switzerland from hospitals in
high MDRO prevalence areas are unnecessarily screened for MDRO colonization. Basing our screening strategy on
certain criteria (such as presence of skin lesions, active infection, antibiotic treatment, history of a surgical procedure
abroad and hospitalization outside of Europe) promises to be a better targeted and more cost-effective strategy.
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Multi-drug resistant organisms (MDRO) are known to
negatively impact patient outcomes (due to delaying and
limiting antibiotic treatment options) and represent a con-
siderable threat to public health because they can be trans-
mitted from person-to-person. MDROs are becoming
more prominent worldwide [1, 2]. In Europe, the average
percentage of Klebsiella pneumoniae resistant to third
generation cephalosporins (a surrogate for the production
of extended-spectrum betalactamase, ESBL) increased
markedly over the last few years (21.5 % in 2009 to 25.7 %
in 2012) [3]. Nevertheless, there are significant regional
differences in prevalence [1–4]. In 2012, the percentage of
K. pneumoniae resistant to third generation cephalosporin
for example was 1.7 % in Finland, 10-25 % in Germany
and France, 25-50 % in Italy and 74.8 % in Bulgaria [3].
Certain countries outside Europe suffer from enormous
rates of MDROs (e.g., India, with an average prevalence of
72 %) [1]. In Switzerland, the “Sentinel Surveillance of
Antibiotic Resistance in Switzerland” (www.anresis.ch)
identified 5.4 % of K.pneumoniae to be resistant to third
generation cephalosporins in 2012 [5]. In our own institu-
tion, only 0.9 % of the K. pneumoniae tested in 2012 were
ESBL producers.
MDROs may simply colonize a patient or cause an in-
fection. Delayed administration of adequate antibiotic
therapy and increased mortality are consequences of in-
fection with MDROs [6, 7]. Being colonized with an
MDRO alone may lead to prolonged ICU stays, however,
and is associated with increased mortality [8]. Apart
from the implications for individual patients, there is the
potential for interpersonal transmission and outbreaks
[2, 9, 10]. These transmissions do not stop at inter-
national borders. Patients often return either colonized
or infected with an MDRO after hospitalization abroad
[2, 8, 11–13] especially if the visited country struggles
with antimicrobial resistance. A good example for this is
the spread of NDM-1 (New Delhi metallo-β-lactamase):
this resistance gene was first detected in 2008 in a pa-
tient who had been hospitalized in India; today, just a
few years later, NDM-1 has spread to forty countries
[13]. The stay in regions with a high MDRO prevalence
is therefore an established risk factor for the acquisition
of such an organism [12, 14, 15].
The Infection Prevention Unit at Bern University
Hospital pursues a multi-pronged strategy to keep the
MDRO prevalence low that is based on recommenda-
tions by national and international guidelines [16–18].
One goal of this strategy is to identify patients who are
colonized with a MDRO as early as possible. This aligns
with recommendations to screen those with a high risk
of being colonized with an MDRO [15, 19], including
patients transferred directly from a hospital abroad or
those who were hospitalized abroad in the previousfour weeks up to 12 months [15, 20]. Due to limited
data on the MDRO situation in many countries a German
expert commission now advises to screen patients with a
suggestive medical history irrespective of the place of stay
abroad [15].
The aim of our study was to determine risk factors for
MDRO colonization among transfer patients that will
help us target high-risk patients in our future approach
to screening.
Methods
The University Hospital of Bern is a 950-bed tertiary
care hospital that includes a 30-bed intensive care
unit (ICU) and covers all medical specialties. Each
year, there are approximately 38`000 admissions. Ac-
cording to written local infection control guidelines
so-called “transfer patients” are screened on admission
for carriage of MRSA (methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus
aureus), ESBL (extended spectrum betalactamase) -posi-
tive, and carbapenemase-producing Gram-negative bac-
teria. Transfer patients are defined as patients who were
exposed to a healthcare system abroad or in a high preva-
lence region in Switzerland over the past six months. High
prevalence regions in our country are those with ESBL K.
pneumoniae or MRSA rates >10 %, such as western and
southern Switzerland (www.anresis.ch; accessed March
20, 2015). Exposure to a healthcare system includes ad-
mission to a hospital or outpatient visit in a medical cen-
ter independent of the time the patient spent there or the
reason for seeking care. The definition includes both pa-
tients who were directly transferred from a hospital
abroad (i.e., repatriated) and those who returned by them-
selves. Transfer patients are screened at our institution re-
gardless of whether they were hospitalized or seen as
outpatients.
In this screening study we analyzed transfer patients
who had a standard admission screening (with or with-
out additional screening tests) between January 1, 2012
and December 31, 2013 (a 24-month period). A standard
admission screening for MDRO required at minimum a
nasal and an inguinal swab plus either a rectal swab or a
stool sample. Additionally, if present, a swab was taken
from skin lesions, wound drainage in a patient with a
drain in place, urine in patients with urinary catheter
and tracheal secretions in intubated or tracheostomy pa-
tients; these risk factor-based screening tests were la-
beled as extended screening. For the swabs, we used a
cotton tip moistened with sterile 0.9 % saline solution. A
positive admission screening meant that at least one of
the screening samples showed an MDRO. A standard
screening set costs approximately 118 Swiss Francs.
For identifying patients with an MDRO screening on ad-
mission, we used the database of the Bern University Insti-
tute for Infectious Diseases, where all microbiological
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dataset was supplemented with data on patients’ length of
stay in the hospital abroad, the interval between that stay
and our screening, country of exposure, mode of patient
transfer, antibiotic treatment, hospital service at admis-
sion, medical devices at time of admission, skin lesions at
admission, clinical presentation and history of surgical
procedure from the hospital electronic medical records. If
a patient was admitted more than once during the study
period, only the first admission was included. We ex-
cluded screenees younger than 16 years.
Microbiological analysis
For the MRSA screening we used a Mannitol-oxacillin
biplate. Identification of Staphylococcus aureus was done
according to laboratory standard procedures. Suscepti-
bility testing of S. aureus was performed using the
Kirby-Bauer disk diffusion test and test results were
interpreted according to the Clinical Laboratory Stan-
dards Institute (CLSI) standards [21, 22].
For the screening of ESBL and carbapenemase produ-
cing bacteria we used CHROMagar™ ESBL, McConkey
with ceftazidime, and Drigalski with cefotaxime [23].
Statistical analyses
The statistical analyzes were performed using the STATA
12 software package. Categorical data were analyzed using
the χ 2-test or the Fisher's exact test. For comparing of
continuous variables we employed Student's t-test or
Mann-Whitney U-test as appropriate. We created a multi-
variate model using logistic regression to identify inde-
pendent risk factors for MDRO carriage. For assessing
model quality, we used goodness-of-fit tests. A p-value
of <0.05 was considered statistically significant.
Ethical aspects
The data for patients included here were generated dur-
ing routine medical care. MDRO screening was started
as part of the hospital`s risk assessment strategy by the
infection prevention program. There were no study-
specific interventions administered. Quality improve-
ment activities such as those initiated by the infection
prevention program are exempt from IRB review at our
institution.
Results
Among 287 patients who had a complete admission
screening for MDRO between January 1, 2012 and
December 31, 2013, 52 did not qualify as transfer patients
by our criteria and were therefore excluded. We further
analyzed the remaining 235 patients. Of those, 97 (41 %)
were female and 138 (59 %) men. Median age was 58 years
(range, 17-95). Two hundred and fifteen (91 %) patients
had their residence in Switzerland at the time ofscreening while 20 (9 %) patients reported a residence
abroad. Of the 235 patients, 15 (6.4 %) were transferred
from a hospital in a high endemic region in Switzerland,
145 (61 %) patients had contact to a healthcare system
in another European country. The remaining 75 pa-
tients (32 %) returned from countries outside of Europe.
In total, 43 (18 %) of the 235 patients were screened
positive for an MDRO. Most of them yielded resistant
Gram-negative bacteria (42; 98 %) with only a single
screening result revealing MRSA (2 %); three screenings
showed a combination of MRSA and Gram-negatives.
Thirty-six patients (15 %) were colonized with one bac-
terial species, 6 (2.6 %) with two species, and one patient
(0.4 %) with three different species.
Next we attempted to determine risk factors for having
a positive screening result (Table 1). For this particular
analysis we focused on Gram-negative bacteria, which
were detected in 42 out of 235 patients. Most of them
were ESBL-positive E. coli and K. pneumoniae while only
two were carbapenemase producers. Significant associa-
tions for screening positivity were found for the followings
variables: antibiotic treatment on admission was more fre-
quent in carriers vs. non-carriers [17/42 (40.5 %) carriers
vs. 43/193 (22.3 %) non-carriers; p = 0.014], patients who
had an active infection on admission [15/40 (37.5 %) vs.
29/183 (15.83 %); p = 0.002]. Also, skin lesions on admis-
sion were associated with a positive screening [17/42
(40.5 %) vs. 34/193 (17.6 %); p = 0.001]. Carriers were
more likely to have undergone a surgical procedure in
a hospital abroad than non-carriers [15/42 (35.7 %)
vs. 33/193 (17.1 %); p = 0.007].
A standard screening set required a minimum of three
samples. Those who were found to be colonized had a
median of four samples (range, 3-10) which was more
than the 3 samples (range, 3-9) in those with negative
screenings (p = 0.03).
The 235 patients had contact to healthcare systems in
a total of 62 different countries. Because of the low
number of patient transfers from each individual coun-
try, we grouped them based on regions (Table 1). There
were more carriers among those patients who had con-
tact with a healthcare system outside of Europe than in
those who returned from an European country [24/42
(57.1 %) vs. 51/193 (2.4 %); p < 0.001].
Of note, direct transfer form a referring hospital
was not associated with a higher likelihood of
colonization (p = 0.42). The maximum interval be-
tween last healthcare exposure abroad and presenta-
tion to our hospital was 126 days in those who
returned by themselves (indirect transfer patients).
Among indirect transfer patients, this interval was
not different between carriers and non-carriers [21.92
(±24.6) vs. 21.16 (±28.9); p = 0.9]. There was also no
association between screening positivity and whether
Table 1 Risk factors for colonization with Gram-negative bacteria in 235 transfer patients







sex (female) 20 (47.6 %) 77 (39.9 %) 1.4 (0.7-2.7) 0.36
Age 53 (±16.6) 55.4 (±19.6) 0.99 (0.98-1.01) 0.46
Swiss residents 37 (88.1 %) 178 (92.2 %) 0.6 (0.2-1.8) 0.37
Inpatient hospitalization in Bern 36 (85.7 %) 170 (88.1 %) 0.8 (0.3-2.1) 0.67
• Intensive care unit 10 (23.8 %) 29 (15.0 %) 1.8 (0.8-3.98) 0.17
• surgical wards 13 (31.0 %) 74 (38.3 %) 0.7 (0.4-1.5) 0.37
• medical wards 13 (31.0 %) 67 (34.7 %) 0.8 (0.4-1.7) 0.64
Number of swabs/samples 4 (3-10) 3 (3-9) 1.4 (1.1-1.7) 0.03
Risk factors on admission:
Medical device 13 (31.0 %) 41 (21.2 %) 1.7 (0.8-3.5) 0.18
• urinary catheter 10 (23.8 %) 36 (18.7 %) 1.4 (6.1-3.02) 0.45
• intubation/ tracheostomy 6 (14.3 %) 11 (5.7 %) 2.8 (0.96-7.9) 0.09
• wound drain 3 (7.1 %) 4 (2.1 %) 3.6 (0.8-16.9) 0.11
Skin lesion 17 (40.5 %) 34 (17.6 %) 3.2 (1.5-6.5) 0.001 1.9 (0.7-4.7) 0.18
Number of risk factors 0 (0-3) 0 (0-3) 2.02 (1.4-2.97) 0.0006
Antibiotic treatment 17 (40.5 %) 43 (22.3 %) 2.4 (1.2-4.8) 0.014 1.3 (0.5-3.3) 0.54
• number of antibiotics 0 (0-3) 0 (0-3) 1.7 (1.2-2.6) 0.008
• antibiotic days up to admission 8.5 (±11.7) 5.8 (±6.4) 1.03 (0.96-1.1) 0.31
Active infection 15 (37.5 %) 29 (15.9 %) 3.2 (1.5-6.8) 0.002 2.7 (1.07-6.6) 0.035
Surgical procedure abroad 15 35.7 % 33 17.1 % 2.7 (1.3-5.6) 0.007 1.5 (0.6-3.8) 0.39
Direct transfer 24 (57.1 %) 123 (63.7 %) 0.8 (0.4-1.5) 0.42
Indirect transfer, days between
last exposure abroad until admission
22 (±24.6) 21 (±28.9) 1.0 (0.98-1.02) 0.92
Individual transportation 13 (31.0 %) 55 (28.5 %) 1.1 (0.5-2.3) 0.75
Europe 18 (42.9 %) 142 (73.6 %) 0.3 (0.1-0.5) <0.001
• Switzerland 2 (4.8 %) 13 (6.7 %) 0.7 (0.2-3.2) 1
• Spain 4 (9.5 %) 25 (13.0 %) 0.7 (0.2-2.2) 0.54
• Italy 2 (4.8 %) 27 (14.0 %) 0.3 (0.1-1.4) 0.099
• France 4 (9.5 %) 15 (7.8 %) 1.2 (0.4-3.97) 0.754
Outside Europe 24 (57.1 %) 51 (26.4 %) 3.7 (1.9-7.4) <0.001 3.2 (1.5-6.8) 0.002
• Asia 14 (33.3 %) 25 (13.0 %) 3.4 (1.6-7.2) 0.001
o south/southeast Asia 9 (21.4 %) 11 (5.7 %) 4.5 (1.7-11.7) 0.003
• Africa 6 (14.3 %) 11 (5.7 %) 2.8 (0.96-7.9) 0.09
• America (North, South) 3 (7.1 %) 13 (6.7 %) 1.1 (0.3-3.9) 1
*Mean (± standard deviation, SD) for normal distribution or median (range) for others
Note. Transfer patients are patients who were exposed to a healthcare system abroad or in a high prevalence region in Switzerland over the past six months
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abroad (p = 0.5).
Further, we determined independent predictors for
screening positivity and identified active infection on
admission as a significant risk factor [odds Ratio, OR
2.67 (95 % CI 1.07- 6.65); p = 0.035] as well as con-
tact with a healthcare system outside of Europe [OR
3.23 (95 % CI 1.54- 6.79); p = 0.002] (Table 1).Discussion
This study focused on MDRO colonization in transfer
patients from abroad admitted to our institution. Our
data show that a significant proportion (18 %) of patients
who were exposed to a healthcare system abroad or had
been hospitalized in high endemicity region within
Switzerland over the last six month were colonized with
an MDRO. This observation reflects other reports [8, 11,
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of MDROs in transfer patients [8, 20]. The fact that
most screenings yielded resistant Gram-negative bacteria
is also consistent with recently published data [8, 11].
The very low rate of MRSA detections, however, is un-
expected given the higher rates of MRSA abroad, as sug-
gested by data from the European Centre for Disease
Prevention and Control [3].
A number of studies show that traveling to certain for-
eign countries is a risk factor for acquiring MDRO
colonization [24–27]. In these studies travel to India and
the African continent stood out for the elevated rates of
such colonization. India, in particular, is notable for be-
ing the country where the NDM-1 resistance gene first
surfaced [13]. Many other Asian countries are affected
by this development. Our data confirm that patients
returning from Asia were more likely to be colonized
than those returning from other regions. In contrast to a
study from the Netherlands, southern Europe could not
be linked to MDRO colonization in our work, even
though there is a gradient of Gram-negative resistance
from the Mediterranean area to Scandinavia [3, 11].
Transfer of a patient from outside Europe remained an
independent factor for colonization in our analysis.
Our findings also show that transfer patients who re-
ceived antibiotic treatment on admission were more
likely to have a positive screening. This finding is not
surprising. Even without an appropriate travel history,
prior antibiotic use is a well-recognized risk factor for
colonization and infection with MDROs [14, 28–31].
The Dutch study also meant to elucidate the associ-
ation between patient-related factors and MDRO car-
riage in repatriated patients [11]. It is, however, an older
study conducted between 1998 and 2001, when the glo-
bal prevalence of MDROs, especially of Gram-negative
bacteria, was much lower than today. This may be an ex-
planation for why we identified additional risk factors.
Skin lesions and a history of surgical procedure abroad,
for example, were associated with having a positive
screening in our study. To our knowledge this has not
been recognized in returning patients before. However,
our findings align with the commonality of risk factors
for resistant pathogens first highlighted by Safdar and
Maki in 2002 [31]. Patients who had an active infection
on admission to our institution were also more likely to
have a positive screening and this association remained
in the multivariate model.
The standard screening set (nasal, inguinal swab, plus
either a rectal swab or stool sample) was supplemented
by additional swabs if certain clinical factors were
present (skin lesions, urine in patients with urinary cath-
eter, drainage fluid in a patient with wound drain in
place, and tracheal secretions in intubated or tracheos-
tomy patients). Based on this a transfer patient had atminimum of three screening samples taken. Those who
turned out to be carriers had more screening samples
taken (corresponding to the wounds or devices they
had) than the non-carriers. In the literature, exposure to
all types of invasive devices appears as a risk factor for
MDRO acquisition [31].
The definition of transfer patients is not uniform in
older studies. We defined transfer patients as patients
who were exposed to a healthcare system abroad or in a
high prevalence region in Switzerland over the past six
months. In some studies the authors only captured pa-
tients who underwent direct transfer from a hospital
abroad [8, 11], while others screened patients who were
exposed over various time frames, e.g., the past 4 weeks
[20] or 12 months [2, 15]. In our study, the longest inter-
val between last healthcare exposure and presentation to
our hospital was 126 days. We do not know if longer in-
tervals were missed by the admitting services or if there
were in fact none. The ideal time frame to incorporate
distant healthcare exposure abroad remains unclear.
We screened all transfer patients on admission inde-
pendent of whether they had been in- or outpatients
abroad and found no association between screening
positivity and the type of hospital exposure. We could
not identify other studies that made this comparison.
Kaiser and colleagues [11] found no association between
duration of stay at a hospital abroad and MDRO
colonization, which supports our findings. Thus, it ap-
pears that the length of hospitalization abroad has lim-
ited influence on the colonization status, just like type of
exposure has. While some studies show that contact to a
healthcare institution or a transfer from abroad is a risk
factor [14, 20], others demonstrate that healthy travelers
who were never hospitalized abroad were found to carry
MDROs when they returned home [24–27]. It is unclear
if a stay in a hospital abroad is a more relevant deter-
minant of MDRO acquisition than a visit in a high en-
demic country. More studies are necessary to answer
this question.
The original aim of the study was to elicit factors that
could help us improve our screening strategy. Had we
limited the screening to those with risk factors
(hospitalization outside Europe, history of surgical pro-
cedure in the hospital abroad and – on admission to our
hospital - active infection, presence of skin lesion and
antibiotic treatment), we would have swabbed only
61.7 % (145 patients) of all transfer patients. With this
“risk factor based screening” we would have found 36
patients with multiresistant Gram-negative bacteria,
representing 86 % of all carriers we identified with the
current strategy.
A standard screening set costs approximately 118 Swiss
Francs. For 235 screenings, assuming standard triple sets,
we spent 27`730 Swiss Francs. This is 660 Swiss Francs
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ternative strategy would have been 475 Swiss Francs.
Modifying our strategy to only screen patients with ≥ 1
out of five risk factors would have meant missing six colo-
nized patients. A detailed cost-benefit analysis, however,
would need to take secondary costs such as clinical infec-
tion and transmission to others into account.
Our study has some limitations. We did not conduct ad-
mission screening for all patients and cannot make a
statement on baseline MDRO colonization in our patient
population. Moreover, we cannot be sure that every pa-
tient who had a contact to a healthcare system abroad was
screened on admission. This depended on the admitting
service and their thoroughness when taking the history.
Because of the missing or insufficient documentation of
patient histories from the hospitals abroad we were only
able to analyze antibiotic treatment on admission in our
hospital and could not collect sufficient data on previous
antibiotic treatment. Also, it was not possible for us to de-
termine how long their stay in the hospital abroad was if
patients had been inpatients there. As we screened pa-
tients on admission to our hospital we also cannot be sure
if patients acquired the MDRO in the hospital abroad or if
they were colonized with these bacteria before traveling to
the foreign country.
Conclusion
Guidelines recommend to screen patients returning after
exposure to a healthcare system abroad. We screened pa-
tients who were exposed to healthcare abroad or in a high
prevalence region in Switzerland over the past six months
assuming they were at risk for being colonized with
MDROs. Eighteen percent of these patients were screened
positive on admission. The major risk factors for acquiring
a Gram-negative MDRO was hospitalization outside of
Europe (p < 0.001), history of surgical procedure in the
hospital abroad (p = 0.007), and on admission to our
hospital active infection (p = 0.002), antibiotic treatment
(p = 0.014) and presence of skin lesions (p = 0.001). Only
hospitalization outside of Europe and active infection on
admission remained as independent predictors.
Our data suggest that a large proportion of patients
(i.e., 82 %) transferred to Switzerland from hospitals in
high MDRO prevalence areas are unnecessarily screened
for MDRO colonization. Basing our screening strategy
on certain criteria (such as presence of skin lesion, active
infection, antibiotic treatment, history of surgical pro-
cedure abroad and hospitalization outside of Europe)
could be a more cost-effective strategy.
Key points
We performed a screening study of and determined
risk factors for multi-drug resistant organism (MDRO)
colonization in patients transferred from abroad.Independent risk factors for being MDRO colonized
were hospitalization outside of Europe, surgical pro-
cedure in the hospital abroad, active infection at time
of admission, antibiotic treatment on admission and
skin lesions on admission.
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